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Introduction 
 In this manuscript I will argue a) that at least in developed economies the rate 
of new firm formation is crucially important for economic development; b) that it 
varies considerably over time and space; c) that policy programs aimed at increasing 
or supporting entrepreneurial activity have a disappointing track record, and d) that 
institutional reform aiming at the creation and maintenance of a transparent and stable 
formal institutional framework that is conducive to entrepreneurial activity is the most 
suitable task for entrepreneurship policy. In support of my argument I will build 
heavily on experiences from my own research – because it is what I know best – but 
even more heavily on the 'big names' in this branch of research – because it represents 
the most compelling evidence. I will only make cursory references to other parts of 
the now relatively voluminous field we call 'entrepreneurship research'. In order to 
enhance the credibility of my conclusions I would like to emphasize that for the most 
part they do not reflect what my own research has tried to prove; neither do they 
reflect any ideology I had as baggage when first entering the field. Rather, they are a 
reflection of what the totality of knowledge development in this area over more than 
twenty years has led me to believe. 
 
Entrepreneurship is important 
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There is little doubt that entrepreneurship is important. In theory, 
entrepreneurship – understood as the entry of new firms in the market – drives the 
market process and develops the economy through the following mechanisms (cf. 
Davidsson, 2003, 2004a; Kirzner1, 1973): 
• It provides buyers with new choices which some of them will consider better 
than extant alternatives. 
• It provides incumbent firms with an incentive to shape up their game in order 
to survive the new competition. 
• If successful, it attracts followers that further augment the two above effects. 
Empirical research supports the notion that entrepreneurship is important. 
Based on data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) an estimated 500 
million people around the globe are involved in on-going or recent business start-ups 
at any one time (Reynolds2, 2007; Reynolds, Bygrave, & Autio, 2004). This sheer 
volume of the phenomenon makes it very important. In the late 1970s, David Birch3 
sparked much of the political and academic interest in entrepreneurship with his 
(surprise) finding that small firms created the bulk of all new jobs (Birch, 1979). This 
finding has since been replicated in many countries/studies including my own 
(Davidsson, Lindmark, & Olofsson, 1994, 1996), which also singled out new firm 
formation as an important driver of regional economic well-being. Importantly, later 
works attribute the positive effects either to the influx of new firms or to a small elite 
of rapidly growing young firms rather than to the population of established small 
firms (Birch & Medoff, 1994; Davidsson, Lindmark, & Olofsson, 1998). Newness is 
closely linked to innovation. Regarding this topic Arrow4 (1983) has provided 
theoretical rationales why small, owner-managed organizations can be expected to be 
over represented as innovators as long as development costs are not prohibitive. 
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Careful empirical analysis by Acs and Audretsch (1990)5 largely confirms his 
predictions.  
Importantly, it is not only the net additions to the economy that drive 
development, but the churning and displacement as well. While this goes to the heart 
of Joseph Schumpeter's (1934) ideas of ‘creative destruction’ the first part of that 
notion seems easier to embrace than the second part. New firms improve the 
economy not only by introducing newness that is in one way or the other more 
efficient or effective; they also force inefficient firms out of business so that their 
resources can be redeployed for better use. Similarly, if no firms exited an economy 
at full capacity there would be no affordable physical or human resources available 
for new start-ups. In my research this importance of the ‘churning’ has been indicated 
by gross measures of regional economic dynamism explaining more of the 
development of regional economic well-being than what net measures can explain 
(Davidsson et al., 1998). In a more sophisticated analysis using unique, longitudinal 
data, Aviad and Vertinsky (2008) have recently shown empirically that exits of old 
firms increase entry and that on average new entrants are more productive. Persistent 
high local rates of exit, however, deter entry.  
This alleged importance of entrepreneurship is not based on idiosyncrasies of 
a few studies. Through a careful review of 87 analyses in 57 recent studies of high 
quality, van Praag and Versloot (2007) found support that young and small firms 
contribute heavily to employment creation – both directly and via regional spill-over 
– as well as to productivity growth and high quality innovations. However, as the 
authors point out this does not mean that larger and more established firms are in any 
way unimportant, it is just that different categories of firm perform different roles in 
the economic system. The review by van Praag et al. demonstrates that there is little 
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doubt that in developed economies, entry of individuals into self-
employment/business ownership, and of independent firms into the market, are major 
forces in economic development6.  
 
There is considerable variance in entrepreneurship across space and time 
There is considerable variability in the ‘amount’ of entrepreneurship exercised 
in different economies. For example, the GEM research shows that among the 42 
countries participating in the 2006 survey, the proportion of the working age 
population that is involved in ‘early stage entrepreneurial activity’ – either an on-
going business start-up effort or a firm that got up and running within the last 42 
months, or both – varies between 2.7 percent (Belgium) and 40.2 percent (Peru). A 
quick inspection of which countries have the highest and lowest prevalence rates 
shows it is not a simple case of ‘the more business start-ups, the better’, although 
within the sub-sample of developed countries that generalization largely seems to 
hold. In a harmonized, seven country study on the causes of regional variation in new 
firm activity (Reynolds, Storey7, & Westhead, 1994), found that the regional rates of 
formation typically varied by a factor of two to four across regions within countries; 
less than the enormous variability across countries in GEM but still very substantial 
considering the apparent importance of new firm formation for economic 
development.  
As regards variation over time, Gartner8 and Shane (1995) show that a stock 
measure of entrepreneurship – the number of organisations per 1000 population – 
varies considerably over time. In the United States this measure was below 10 when 
records started in 1857. It then increased steadily until it reached about 18 in 1890. 
This was followed by a period of oscillation between 15 and 18 from 1890 to 1950, 
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after which time it started to decline steadily for three decades eventually levelling off 
at around 12. From 1982 their data show a sharp increase of unprecedented strength 
and in the early 1990s – the end of the data series – the number of organizations per 
capita reached about 35 per 1000 people. While there are some questions marks 
regarding the consistency of data quality and the suitability of a stock measure mean 
these estimates are surrounded by some uncertainty, very high quality Swedish data 
confirm a high level of variability over time. The number of genuinely new firms 
entering the Swedish economy per annum in 1997-2006 varied between 34,000 and 
44,000 – about 30 percent up or down – in a limited amount of time (ITPS, 2007). 
Taking more of a historians perspective and a applying a broader notion of 
entrepreneurship, Baumol9 (1990) provides a fascinating account of how  expressions 
of productive entrepreneurship have swung over time, with particular emphasis on 
ancient Rome; Medieval China and the earlier vs. later middle ages in Europe.  
Accounts like these leave little doubt that there is considerable variation in the 
level of entrepreneurship over time and space. There must be reasons for this variation 
– perhaps manageable reasons – and this leads us to the topic of the next section. 
 
It is very difficult to ‘manage’ the variation in entrepreneurship 
 A very popular idea, which also directed much of the early empirical research, 
is that entrepreneurs are ‘a breed apart’; that their entrepreneurial inclination is the 
result of some unique entrepreneurial personality that most of them have in common. 
By and large, this is a false conjecture. It is likely rooted in a general human tendency 
to seek reasons for outcomes in the characteristics of the actors even when these 
characteristics have no influence on the outcome whatsoever – what psychologists 
have called ‘the fundamental attribution error’ (Ross, 1977). Consequently the early, 
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personality-focused research yielded meagre results and fell into disrepute (Gartner, 
1988). More recent, conceptually as well as methodologically more sophisticated 
research has shown that personality does play a role in entrepreneurship (Baum & 
Locke, 2004 Ciavarella, Buchholts, Riordan, Gatewood, & Stokes, 2004; Collins, 
Hanges, & Locke, 2004). However, stable personality characteristics provide at best a 
small part of the full explanation. More importantly, personality is not ‘manageable’ 
so knowledge of such relationships could be used for selection at best. The results 
suggest that even for that limited purpose they would be rather blunt and ineffective 
tools.  
 A consistent finding in many studies is that many business founders have self-
employed parents (Davidsson, 2004b)  More recent research has ventured into 
investigating the exact mechanism of this parental role model effect (Aldrich10, 
Renzulli, & Langton, 1998).  However, the relationship is very far from deterministic. 
It is probably true in most countries and eras that a majority of business founders do 
not have a close, parental role model and – conversely – that most children of 
business founders do not choose an entrepreneurial career. And again we are dealing 
with an effect that is not very useful for policy purposes; people have the parents they 
have.  
 The third major type of explanation of entrepreneurial behaviour and success 
on the individual level is Human Capital (Becker11, 1964) – the comprehensiveness, 
quality and suitability for the task of people’s education and work experience. Arnold 
Cooper12 was one of the first to research the role of human capital for 
entrepreneurship (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994). The effects found were 
usually positive. This has been confirmed by other studies (e.g., Dahlqvist, 
Davidsson, & Wiklund, 2000). However, while there is overwhelming evidence that 
 7
investing in general human capital is a good idea for nations, it is hardly something 
policy makers would do for the specific purpose of furthering entrepreneurship in the 
form of independent business start-ups. In the hypothetical case that they did there is 
no guarantee the policy would be effective because for people with more valuable 
education and experience the non-entrepreneurial alternatives at hand would also 
increase in attractiveness (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997). Besides, many of 
the positive effects in an entrepreneurship context are ascribed to specific rather than 
general human capital – e.g., prior start-up experience and experience from the 
particular industry (Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Shane, 2000) – and these are not easy 
for policy-makers to invest in.  
 Overall, the individual level determinants of entrepreneurial behaviour and 
success do not appear very useful from an entrepreneurship policy point of view. For 
one thing, they explain at best who becomes an entrepreneur; not how many will do 
so. Additional limitations have been discussed above. This gives reason to look more 
closely at aggregate level determinants. While research on such determinants has been 
comparatively successful in terms of explanatory power a main lesson learnt from 
such research is also that influencing the amount or quality of entrepreneurial activity 
on, for example, the regional level is anything but easy. In the aforementioned, 
harmonised seven-country study the conclusions were summarised as follows:   
Analysis of the processes associated with new firm births across seven advanced market 
economies…indicates three processes having a positive impact on firm birth rates: 
• growth in demand, indicated by population growth and growth in income 
• a population of business organizations dominated by small firms 
• a dense, urbanized context, reflecting the advantages of agglomeration (…) 
Other processes—related to unemployment, personal wealth, liberal political climate or 
government actions—had weak or mixed impact. (p. 453) 
 
Few conclusions about entrepreneurship have as solid empirical backing as 
these. Several things are worth noting about these results. First, the three factors that 
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have a consistent effect are not suitable targets for specific entrepreneurship policy. 
Instead, they are such fundamental structural and dynamic forces that one can start to 
understand what policy programs intended to stimulate business start-ups are up 
against.  
As a case in point our own research (Davidsson et al., 1994, 1996) suggested 
that government business development expenditure per capita had a positive effect on 
gross start-up rates but no effect on net start-up rates. On a more detailed level, we 
found that in both time periods – the economic upturn of the late 1980s and the deep 
recession of the early 1990s – a particular, sparsely populated region in the northern 
inland of Sweden consistently made the 'top ten' list of regions for gross start-ups and 
equally consistently ended up among the bottom ten in net start-up rates. This was 
also one of the regions receiving the highest government investments in direct 
government support for business development. More recently Greene, Mole and 
Storey (2007) have provided much more comprehensive evidence of the same kind. 
Following the development of the 'disadvantaged' northern English region of Teesside 
over three decades they conclude that while some effects on financing and business 
advice can be noted, the total effects of the varied and rather massive business 
development support investments this region has received are very limited. Findings 
like these illustrate the difficulty of achieving any real effects when more fundamental 
factors like relative costs and local demand are not supportive.  Consequently, the 
level of investment is hard to defend from a cost-benefit perspective.  
 
What should be 'managed' if we could manage it? 
A first aspect of this question is what category of start-up should be encouraged. 
Roughly speaking, at least 80 percent of all independent start-ups – sometimes 
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denoted the 'mice' – tend to be relatively mundane, imitative start-ups in mature 
industries, showing little innovation and having limited growth prospects and/or 
growth aspirations. The remaining 20 percent are somewhat more innovative and 
growth orientated but the proportion that is based on truly radical innovation, have 
Venture Capital backing and are heading for an eventual stock market listing – the 
true 'gazelles' as the category is sometimes called – is much smaller still; down to 
fractions of a percentage point (cf. Reynolds, 2007; Reynolds & Curtin, 2008). 
 This begs the question of what category is more important – the gazelles due 
to their innovation and growth or the mice because of their sheer numbers and 
marginal effects on many customers and incumbents. Some have concluded that it is 
really the small elite of higher-potential start-ups that makes all the difference (Birch 
& Medoff, 1994; Wong, Ho, & Autio, 2005). Based on my own research I have 
concluded for Sweden in the 1985-1996 period that it was actually the many 'mice' 
that added up to the large, positive effects of new firms on job creation and regional 
economic development; there simply weren't enough true 'gazelles' around to add up 
to very impressive figures in the aggregate (Davidsson et al., 1994, 1996; Delmar & 
Davidsson, 2006).  
 The true, relative importance of 'mice' vs. 'gazelles' is likely to vary across 
time and space. However, one thing about the alleged job creation prowess of 
'gazelles' is worth noting here. Almost no studies distinguish between organic growth 
and growth obtained through acquisition. From a job creation point of view this 
distinction is crucial. Our analysis showed that the majority of jobs 'created' by high-
growing firms were in fact jobs taken over via acquisitions. Somewhat larger and 
older gazelles in particular were unlikely to show much organic growth – arguably 
'true' job creation – at all.  
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 In all likelihood the economy needs both the large pools of start-ups and a 
significant sub-population of higher potential firms among them. The former is 
important for keeping incumbents on their toes and facilitates the making of as many 
important discoveries of new business opportunities as possible while the latter 
ascertains that the full potential of the more important discoveries be exploited to the 
full, often via copying or acquisition of what was first initiated elsewhere.  
 This brings us to the second aspect of what to support: How can we make 
individuals more prone to create these two types of business start-ups? Perhaps by 
trying to change the individuals themselves? Such an exercise in social engineering 
would hardly be successful. As regards relevant personality and personal background 
attributes people essentially are what they are; trying to change these through policy 
measures would be hard or impossible (not to mention unethical). It makes sense for a 
society to invest in general human capital but probably not for the narrow purpose of 
increasing entrepreneurial activity in the form of independent business start-ups.      
 As regards structural characteristics of regions we have noted that important 
structural determinants do not easily lend themselves to effective policy making for 
the purpose of increasing the number of start-ups. So what options remain? Perhaps 
the cultural dimension should be the target? Research has demonstrated that 
entrepreneurial activities seem to vary systematically with certain dimensions of 
'culture' or prevailing attitudes in a society (e.g., Davidsson, 1995; Shane, 1992). 
However, while ideological competition for the voters' hearts and minds lie at the core 
of the democratic political system, effective 'brainwashing' through a ruling party's 
total control over the media and the education system most certainly does not. 
Moreover, the main findings from my own research into the issue were that a) 
possible cultural and structural determinants of entrepreneurial activities were highly 
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correlated, and b) the structural determinants – basically the current make-up of the 
human and business populations – were much more important than their cultural 
counterparts in explaining variations in levels of entrepreneurial activity (Davidsson, 
1995; Davidsson & Wiklund, 1997). This indicates that to a considerable extent, 
'culture' is an epiphenomenon that is influenced by the more fundamental structural 
(probably including institutional) conditions that are the more direct determinants of 
entrepreneurial activity. If this is the case successful direct manipulation of prevailing 
attitudes – if it were possible – would not in and by itself have the expected effects on 
the number and type of business start-ups that emerge.   
 
The 'impossibility' of (selective) entrepreneurship policy 
 The above gives a rather pessimistic portrayal of the prospects for active 
entrepreneurship policy. While we know beyond reasonable doubt that in developed 
economies the level of new firm formation is an important, positive determinant of 
economic development we do not have any impressive, positive proof that further 
increases in firm start-up rates induced by specific, directed policies have the same 
positive effects as the 'naturally' occurring variation. Neither, I would argue, do we 
have positive proof that policy makers actually can exercise effectively the winner-
picking strategies that would be right if it is only the 'high end' of entrepreneurial 
activity that really matters. As regards evaluation of specific policy measures the 
situation seems to be that most programs are not systematically evaluated at all and 
among those that are the ability to demonstrate positive effects seems inversely 
related to the quality of the evaluation (Storey, 1994, 2000).  
 Although I am not a trained political scientist and cannot even call myself an 
economist (but rather a 'behavioural management researcher' and perhaps 'general 
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social scientist') let me offer some speculations about why policies aimed at 
stimulating entrepreneurship seem to have so limited effects. It is likely not because 
policy makers and their programs are inherently stupid. To suggest that would not 
only be offensive; it would also be exceedingly naive. Rather, I would argue, the 
limited success is attributable to the following three factors. First, the economic 
system is such an intricate, inter-woven system of relationships that it is almost 
impossible for anyone to correctly calculate, predict or trace even roughly the total 
effects of any specific measure. In particular, it is a challenge to adequately consider 
what would have happened in the absence of the measure: what else would that firm 
or individual have done and how would this have contributed to the economy? 
Similarly, it is almost impossible to know what did not happen as an unintended result 
of and action: the seemingly successful support of a particular firm or region may well 
crowd out an unseen an even more important development of another start-up or 
region. Second, while the level of support is quite substantial in some countries and 
regions – way above the optimum in large parts of Europe would be my guess – its 
possible effects are still dwarfed by more fundamental forces like population growth; 
industry structure; macro-economic swings and major technological breakthroughs. 
For this reason micro level policies can at best expect to contribute on the margin. 
Third, because of human ageing; the logic of promotion in organizations, and the 
nature of the democratic political system, policy makers at all levels are relatively 
unlikely to have thorough experience in their current role. This in combination with 
the intricacies of the economic 'eco-system' increases the risk that the measures they 
suggest and implement, while enthusiastic and well intended enough, will in fact be ill 
conceived. Greene et al. (2007) give multiple examples of how specific policies are 
recycled or resurrected over time although they did not prove successful the last time 
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it was tried, either. Even if well conceived there is considerable risk that at the local 
level front line the implementation will be handled by individuals who are either 
under qualified, under paid and unengaged, or by local champions who are 
enthusiastic enough but who have a tendency to tweak the intentions of the policy 
towards benefiting the visible, local businesses that exist today rather than to the 
optimal working of the economic system, including the more effective competitor that 
could have emerged tomorrow had not the policy been biased against it.    
 For these reasons I have come to believe that direct, selective, tax-funded 
support to business start-up activity that is economically efficient is largely a mission 
impossible. We simply lack the evidence that the tax funds spent that way does any 
more good to the economy than the spending or saving consumers or firms would 
choose to do, had they not been taxed that amount of money. Commercial providers 
and non-government organizations (NGOs) that offer selective, micro level assistance 
do not face the same impossibilities; at least not to the same extent. While the task at 
hand is difficult enough for them as well, market pressures and/or voluntary work 
may lower costs to the point that a positive net result is more achievable. At the very 
least they do not face the dilemma of possible sub-optimal use of taxpayers' 
contributions. 
 Instead I have come to embrace the idea that the proper way for policy to 
improve the contributions of entrepreneurial action lies in the development of sound, 
formal institutions. This largely means laws and law enforcement regarding such 
things as taxation, property rights, bankruptcy, employment contracts, etc. This theme 
will be elaborated on in the next section.  
Institutions are the answer  
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 On a somewhat personal note, let me explain that my conviction that 
'institutions are the answer' does not reflect some political ideology I have always 
embraced or an economic-theoretic paradigm I was trained in. In fact, it does not even 
reflect what most of my research has been focused on. Early in my career (see, e.g., 
Davidsson, 1989) I freely suggested selective, micro level policy measures and I was 
highly sceptical regarding economists’ and lobby groups’ standard recipes related to 
taxes and labour market legislation. I thought I knew that most of the population of 
small business owner-managers would not change their behaviour much in response 
to this or that change in taxes or laws; they had much more fundamental reasons for 
defining their roles and goals the way they did and to act accordingly (which often 
meant rather low-risk, non-growth strategies). To a considerable extent I was right. 
However, I also totally missed the point. What is important about institutional reform 
is not predominantly to achieve behavioural change among current firms and 
entrepreneurs; it is about what the population of entrepreneurs and firms will look like 
in the future. Who will be attracted to entrepreneurship in the first place; how will 
they define their roles and goals; and how will they act in order to reach these goals? 
Institutional reform must look beyond current actors and create an economic system 
capable of continuously reinventing itself within a stable and transparent framework. 
The goal ought to be to promote productive newness, whatever specific form that may 
take in an unpredictable future.  
 One turning point for my thinking was the reading of William Baumol's 1990) 
'Entrepreneurship: Productive, unproductive and destructive'. In this classical article 
Baumol performs an important thought experiment: Let's assume that the supply of 
entrepreneurship (or entrepreneurial talent or effort) is largely the same across time 
and space. What varies is instead how this constant supply is distributed across 
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productive, unproductive and even destructive activities. While the underlying 
assumption may not be entirely true his argument is compelling and provides a 
foundation for a potentially productive refocusing of entrepreneurship policy: let's 
make sure the natural, spontaneous entrepreneurship that will come about is geared 
towards actions that do not only benefit the actors but also is beneficial to society. 
Other inputs that helped re-shape my thinking were various readings in Swedish 
economic history, which left little doubt that a series of institutional reforms in the 
second half of the 19th century created a vibrant economy so that around the verge of 
the 20th century direct involvement in various entrepreneurial projects was very much 
a normal part of middle class life (see, e.g., Gratzer, 1996)), This was also the time 
when what was to become the leading Swedish multinationals of the industrial era 
were created. A  third element in convincing me of the importance of institutions were 
Swedish colleague Magnus Henrekson's careful analysis of how institutions 
subsequently became geared towards supporting the continued success of these large 
exporters at the expense of securing an undergrowth of new firms in emerging 
industries (Davidsson & Henrekson, 2002; Henrekson, 2005).   
 To demonstrate the importance of institutions in empirical research is difficult 
for a variety of reasons. First, within a country at a particular time institutional 
conditions tend to be constants rather than variables so they cannot explain variance 
and hence their importance cannot be demonstrated with conventional methods. In 
addition, micro level studies often focus on current business owner-managers and not 
on those who refrain from (productive) entrepreneurship because current institutions 
make it unattractive. One opportunity to pin down the importance of institutions is 
when some specific law is changed, potentially affecting very specific behaviours of a 
likewise specific sub-population. An example is the Bayh-Dole act in the US, which 
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changed the incentives for researchers and universities to commercialize research 
results. While some have concluded this institutional change was not responsible for 
the subsequent, general increase in university patenting (Mowery & Ziedonis, 2002) a 
more detailed analysis suggested it triggered a shift of patenting towards industry 
sectors more conducive of licensing by (Shane, 2004). Another research strategy is to 
systematically compare two countries that have different institutional frameworks. 
One example is Henrekson and Davis (1999) who convincingly explain under 
representation of certain industries in Sweden relative to the US in this manner (see 
also Carlsson, 2002, for a similar approach, although comparing Sweden with the 
similarly sized and structured economy of Ohio rather than the entire US). However, 
many factors other than the focal institutional dimensions also differ between 
countries or regions subjected to such pairwise analysis. Therefore the disbeliever has 
rich opportunities to suggest other explanations for the alleged effects.  
 This calls for research that assesses both levels of entrepreneurial activity and 
institutional factors in a larger number of countries. This would make other influences 
cancel out or be effectively controlled for. With data from over 40 countries and up to 
10 years, the GEM studies therefore present an unprecedented opportunity to assess 
the influence of institutional factors, especially when the GEM data is combined with 
other sources like OECD or World Bank statistics. Such investigation has already 
commenced (see Small Business Economics, 2005, 2006). However, the most 
important findings from such research have likely not as yet reached publication in 
highly regarded academic outlets. Therefore, belief in the importance of the 
institutional framework cannot at this point rely solely on solid empirical evidence; it 
also requires some faith in the logic of the underlying argument.   
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 Economists – and not only those who regard themselves institutionalists – 
have of course long argued that changes in taxes and regulations are the key to 
increased entrepreneurship. However, arguments based on basic training in economics 
rather than the current frontier of the discipline (which may be the case with lobbyists 
and politically coloured journalists) are often based on assumptions of a single type of 
greedy, self-interested actors and over confidence in immediate behavioural effects 
among current business owner-managers. Developing to the full a fruitful institutional 
approach is beyond the scope of this paper and the abilities of its author. Besides, 
such work should start from a careful analysis of the institutions currently in place in 
a particular country, along with their likely effects. However, as a rough, first sketch; 
let us assume there are different types of potential entrepreneurs: optimists, realists 
and pessimists. On another dimension, let us assume there are the greedy – willing to 
do anything for personal gain – the average, and the altruistic – the latter prone to 
engage in good deeds despite personal monetary loss (or opportunity cost) and 
sometimes even though the project may be doomed because it is not financially 
sustainable. On a third dimension let us assume they have either low, medium or high 
levels of general human capital. We can now ask the fundamental questions that 
should guide the (re-)design of the institutional framework.  
1. Who do we want to engage in entrepreneurship? For example, what does it 
mean for an economy if realists have very good, objective reasons to refrain from 
engaging in business start-ups and only people with rose-colored glasses ever do it? Is 
there any use in trying to convert pessimists at all? Should the framework entice those 
with the highest levels of human capital to strike out on their own? Perhaps they 
would get greater leverage from their talent as independents – but then again this 
might drain large, established organisations of so much talent that the leverage from 
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the resources these organisations represent is diminished so much that the societal net 
effect becomes negative?  
2. How will they define their role and their goals as a result of their early 
experiences as entrepreneurs? An important insight is that the future orientation of 
the firm is not carved in stone at inception. Rather, it will be shaped by early 
experience in the entrepreneurial role as well as through learning from peers. 
Entrepreneurs will gradually form or change their opinion as to whether it is worth the 
effort to be innovative or to take on responsibility as an employer. Arguably, it is 
early in their entrepreneurial career that these things are malleable; later on they may 
be hard to change despite strong economic incentives to do so. In addition, the 'types' 
as sketched above are not fixed; to a considerable extent the entire spectrum resides 
within each individual. Consequently, aspects of the institutional framework can 
appeal to and cultivate either the greedier or the more altruistic side of those who 
venture into entrepreneurship.  
3. How will they go about pursuing their goals? This speaks to Baumol's (1990) main 
point. How can the institutional framework be shaped so that the way for the greedy 
to achieve their goals is aligned with societal interests? So that the altruists find room 
to do their thing in financially sustainable ways? And how can it entice not only 
diehard optimists but also realists and perhaps even some pessimists to engage in 
risky endeavours with outcomes that are highly uncertain but potentially very 
beneficial for themselves and society?  
 Again, this is a sketchy outline by an amateur institutionalist. However, this is 
where my experience from 20 odd years of entrepreneurship research has led me to 
suggest policy makers look: to the experts in analysing the likely effects of current 
and possible future institutional arrangements (see, e.g., Henrekson, 2007). This 
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advice comes with several caveats. First, there is reason to be alert to the possibility of 
self-interested greed as the dominant assumption about humans underlying the 
analysis. Importantly, a productive overview of institutions should not focus too 
narrowly on the conditions for new and emerging firms in some 'absolute' sense but 
also consider the 'other' alternative. That is, the self-employment option relative to 
employment, studies, retirement or unemployment; staying self-employed without 
employees relative to becoming an employer; the institutional conditions for start-ups 
relative to those facing incumbent firms, etc. In addition, the analysis and possible 
change should not only consider incentives for prospective entrepreneurs in a narrow 
sense but also the incentives of various parts of the surrounding, supporting system 
such as universities; private investors; venture capitalists, etc. For this purpose a 
‘competence bloc’ perspective may prove fruitful (Eliasson, 2000).  
Further, the secondary effects of institutional change in domains other than 
entrepreneurship also need to be considered; otherwise what in a narrow assessment 
looks like a successful change may in fact be detrimental in the bigger picture. To 
have their full effect institutional arrangements also need to be transparent and stable. 
Therefore, although initial changes are often likely to be necessary it is imperative 
that the most fundamental of the conditions for entrepreneurial activity achieve an 
almost 'constitutional' status. Therefore, overly enthusiastic introduction of 
controversial measures that risk being reversed when political majorities change may 
do more harm than good. Finally, no wonders should be expected in the short run. 
Yes, the changes will likely affect – at least marginally – the behaviour of some 
current business owner-managers. And yes again, others may not change their 
behaviour directly but the outcome of their unchanged efforts may change (for 
example, them may become more profitable) and this may indirectly change their 
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behaviour in the next time period. The main effect, however, is likely to emerge over 
time as a change in the size and orientation of the population of entrepreneurs and 
entrepreneurial ventures. Hence, considerable patience is called for; there are no quick 
fixes.   
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